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Fairness violations elicit powerful behavioral and affective responses. Indeed, people are
willing to incur costs to sanction unfair behavior. Here we study the possible impact of
long-term mental training in socio-affective capacities such as compassion on altruistic
punishment and compensatory behavior in economic games. To this end we recruited a
group of long-term meditation practitioners (LTPs) who had engaged in an average of 40
K h of mental training exercises including compassion-related meditation, along with a
group of meditation-naïve controls. Participants played several adaptations of the dictator
game in which they had the opportunity to punish the dictator both when they were
the recipients of the dictator’s offer and when they were third-party witnesses to the
dictator’s treatment of an anonymous second player. Compared to controls, LTPs were
less likely to punish when they were the victims of fairness violations. However, both
groups punished equivalently when they witnessed others receiving unfair treatment. In
post-task questionnaires, controls reported significantly more anger in response to unfair
offers than LTPs, although fairness judgments did not differ between groups. These data
suggest that because the LTPs were less angered by unfair treatment of themselves,
they punished that behavior less. However, when they witnessed the unfair treatment of
others, they engaged in norm-reinforcing punishment. Finally, when participants played an
additional game which included the opportunity to recompense victims, LTPs were more
likely to do so. Together these data point to differential approaches to justice whereby LTPs
engaged less in vengeful, retributive justice and focused more on norm reinforcement
and the restoration of equity. These differences suggest that social preferences are plastic
and that altruistic responses to unfairness may be shaped by the prolonged cultivation of
prosocial motivation, altruism, and compassion.
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INTRODUCTION
Human social behavior is governed in part by a set of pervasive
norms (i.e., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Particularly in the con-
text of social exchanges, these norms influence one’s decisions
about how to behave toward the other parties. Fairness norms, for
instance, help determine when one rewards prosocial behavior or
punishes antisocial behavior. Despite the ubiquity of such norms,
decisions in social situations are also subject to an individual’s
social preferences, such as the degree to which one cares about
the well-being of others, both positively and negatively (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007). These social preferences are closely tied to
the emotional reactions elicited by norm violations. Accordingly,
decisions made in social exchange paradigms can result from
emotions elicited during an interaction. Thus, anger in response
to fairness violations can be a powerful determinant of whether
such violations will be subsequently sanctioned or not (Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).
In theory, the social preferences that determine these responses
are highly stable and trait-like (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). But are
they actually fixed and impervious to experience or learning? Or
do they change and evolve within an individual over time?
To explore these questions, we studied a unique sample of
long-term meditation practitioners (LTPs) who had spent years
engaged in different forms of mental training intended to culti-
vate qualities such as loving kindness, altruism, and compassion.
Compassion has been defined as the cognitive and emotional
experience of concern in response to others’ suffering associated
with a motivation to promote the well-being of others (Dalai
Lama and Vreeland, 2001; Keltner and Goetz, 2007; Fehr et al.,
2009). It entails positive affect and concern for different people,
including loved ones and strangers, as well as difficult persons
(Salzberg, 2002). The mental training of the LTPs in this study
was directed at both cognition and affect with practices focused
on mental concentration, the cultivation of concern for the well-
being of others, and the shifting from self- to other-oriented
perspectives (Dalai Lama and Vreeland, 2001; Lutz et al., 2008;
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Klimecki et al., 2013b). We were interested in the extent to which
this extensive training in prosocial motivation and emotions
might influence affective responses to fairness violations, as well
as behavioral responses toward their perpetrators and victims.
Given that negative emotional responses to fairness violations
bear costs both in terms of subjective well-being as well as the sub-
sequent break-down of cooperation (Singer and Steinbeis, 2009),
specific interventions might buffer the detrimental personal and
interpersonal effects of unfair social interactions.
Several arguments suggest an important link between compas-
sion and responses to fairness violations. For one, the definition
of compassion as representing feelings of concern for another’s
suffering and the desire to increase that person’s welfare (Keltner
and Goetz, 2007; Fehr et al., 2009) posits a motivational state:
the desire to relieve another’s suffering. This definition is akin to
the notion of empathic concern, a concept used widely in devel-
opmental and social psychology (Davis, 1983), which has been
linked to prosocial behavior (Batson et al., 1981; Batson, 2009).
For instance, participants who had received the instruction to
generate empathic concern for a person receiving painful electric
shocks were more willing to receive shocks themselves in order
to relieve the other person of their suffering (Batson et al., 1981).
A similar empathic concern induction was also shown to affect
economic decision-making. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma
game, this induction led to greater cooperation with an unrelated
individual compared to when empathy was not induced (Batson
and Moran, 1999). More recently, inducing empathic concern
was shown to buffer the negative effects of previous defection in
repeated interactions (Rumble et al., 2009). In this study, partic-
ipants played a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with a partner
who could defect deliberately as well as accidentally (i.e., through
a fault of the computer). Here the empathic concern induction led
to decreased retaliation, especially when the partner’s defection
was accidental. Another study showed that short-term compas-
sion training led to increased helping behavior in the context of
a computer game designed to assess prosocial behavior (Leiberg
et al., 2011). A further study showed that individuals who had
completed meditation training were more likely to likely to help a
stranger (by offering their seat to a woman on crutches; Condon
et al., 2013). Finally, a study on the effects of training compassion
meditation showed increased altruistic redistribution of funds to
victims of fairness violations (Weng et al., 2013).
While these studies attest to the effects of empathic con-
cern and compassion-related training on altruism and prosocial
behavior, questions remain regarding how compassion training
uniquely affects reactions to norm-violation such as punishment
behavior (i.e., the sanctioning of perpetrators) or compensatory
behavior (i.e., the compensation of victims) after unfair treat-
ments. Furthermore, it is unclear whether training alters per-
ception of fairness or affective responses to fairness violations,
and which of these might be responsible for any observed behav-
ioral changes. Seeing that an inherent aspect of Buddhist mental
training is the cultivation of prosocial qualities such as altruism,
kindness, and compassion as well as the regulation of diffi-
cult afflictive emotions, we expected LTPs to display less anger
after fairness violation while still engaging in sanctioning behav-
iors that enforce fairness norms (Singer and Steinbeis, 2009). In
broader terms, we predicted that the emotional and behavioral
responses of the LTPs would reflect less retributive or vengeful
justice and more restorative justice, aimed at reestablishing equity
among the parties concerned (Nozick, 1981; Darley and Pittman,
2003; Greene, 2008; Aharoni and Fridlund, 2012; FeldmanHall
et al., 2014).
To test for the possible effects of training in compassion and
altruism on responses to fairness violations we used variants of
the dictator game (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al.,
1994; Camerer, 2003), giving participants the opportunity to
punish the actions of the dictator. Specifically, participants could
invest their own endowment to reduce that of the dictator after
either having been the recipient of an offer ranging from fair to
unfair (second party), or having been the passive observer of such
an interaction between two individuals (third party). In exper-
imental game theory it has repeatedly been shown that unfair
offers lead to altruistic punishment, either in the form of an offer
rejection in the ultimatum game or by means of paying mone-
tary units (MUs) in order to reduce the endowment of the one
making the offer (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fowler et al., 2005;
Henrich et al., 2006). Importantly, emotional reactions to unfair
offers, such as anger, are frequently the motivating force behind
altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hopfensitz and
Reuben, 2009). Seeing that compassion entails the generation
of concern for the welfare of others and prosocial motivation,
even toward difficult others, we hypothesized that LTPs would
report less anger in response to unfair offers than controls (Singer
and Steinbeis, 2009). But because the cultivation of compassion
should not affect norms about what is fair and just, we did not
predict any differences in perceptions of fairness. Because anger
is likely to be particularly influential when individuals are the tar-
gets of unfairness and because we believed practitioners would
experience less of this negative affect, we predicted that prac-
titioners would show less of this punishment in the 2nd party
dictator game. Conversely, we predicted that LTPs would demon-
strate comparable punishment as the 3rd party witness to unfair
offers, when they could act to reestablish equitable outcomes via
norm reinforcement (Singer and Steinbeis, 2009).
In a third variant of the game, we investigated whether LTPs
would also show different preferences than controls when given,
in addition to punishment, the option to pay to recompense vic-
tims of fairness violations. It has previously been shown that
short-term compassion training leads to redistribution of a dicta-
tor’s funds after having made an unfair offer in order to equalize
the pay-off between the two players (Weng et al., 2013). The
implementation of equalizing in that study occurred by means
of punishing the dictator, therefore confounding the desire to
equalize with the desire to punish. By giving our participants the
opportunity to recompense either other player in a third party
dictator game, as well as to punish them, we could now dis-
sociate these two different motives. Here we hypothesized that
when given the opportunity, LTPs would show a greater tendency
than controls to restore justice by spending money to compensate
individuals who have been treated unfairly.
In sum, we expected our LTPs, in comparison to the control
group, to (a) show less anger in response to fairness violations, (b)
show less second-party altruistic punishment, (c) similar degrees
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of third-party altruistic punishment, and (d)more recompesatory
behaviors toward the victims of fairness violations.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The study involved two groups of participants: LTPs and controls.
The 18 LTPs (6 women, ages 45–62, mean ± SD age = 54.3 ±
5.8 years) were practitioners of the Nyingma tradition of Tibetan
Buddhism, a practice focused on loving-kindness, altruism, and
compassion. Each had participated in a full-time meditation
retreat of three or more years at the Songsen Chanteloube Retreat
Center in Dordogne, France. The LTPs were recruited as part
of a larger study on the effects of prolonged mental training on
a variety of domains including attention, pain, working mem-
ory capacity, emotional reactivity, as well as brain function and
brain structure. They were contacted directly via email and asked
if they would be willing to participant in a series of studies on
the effects of mental training on the mind and brain. In addi-
tion, we measured 15 age-matched controls (5 women; 46–63
years, mean ±SD age = 54.3 ± 5.8 years). We assessed the IQ
of all subjects using Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000).
LTPs and controls did not differ with respect to IQ (103.6 ± 20.0
vs. 102.4 ± 28.5). All participants provided informed consent
to participate in the study and were paid for their participa-
tion. The study was approved by the University of Leipzig’s Ethics
Committee. All participants took part in extensive tests over
a 2 day period including brain structure and function, emo-
tion regulation, sustained attention and attentional reactivity,
task-independent thought as well as a range of questionnaires.
Whereas, these will not be reported here, given the compre-
hensiveness of psychological assessments over a wide range of
domains it is likely that experimenter demands for any single
set of experiments were considerably reduced. In addition to a
normal participation fee for participation across all experiments,
participants were also paid an additional sum of money depen-
dent on their decisions made in the games. Thus, decisions were
financially incentivized. Each MU in the game was translated into
one cent. At the end all MUs retained by the participant were
paid out.
GAMES
Participants were tested in individual testing sessions which lasted
approximately 1.5 h and were conducted in a computer lab at the
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences
in Leipzig, Germany. Participants completed three separate eco-
nomic games over the course of an approximately 1.5 h experi-
mental session (see Figure 1): a dictator game (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003) with second-
party punishment (2PP), a dictator game with third-party pun-
ishment (3PP), and a dictator game with third party punishment
and recompense (3PR). The games were completed on a desktop
computer and were custom programmed in the Python script-
ing language. The details of each of these games are provided
below. Before each game, participants received detailed instruc-
tions explaining the rules. The instructions for each of these
games are included in the Supplementary Materials. After reading
these instructions, they completed a series of questions designed
to test their understanding of the game. If participants made any
mistakes on this “quiz,” the experimenter went back over the
instructions verbally and asked the participant to correct their
answers. This procedure was repeated until participants provided
all correct responses. Because of time constraints, one partici-
pant did not complete the 3PR and a second participant did not
complete one trial of the 3PR.
To determine which role in the game participants were sup-
posed to play, we pretended to draw lots. These lots led to our
participants always being in the role of the person who was
able to sanction norm violations. For each game, the invest-
ment behavior of the dictator was determined by the computer.
However, we led participants to believe that they were interact-
ing with actual people via an online platform which networked
participants from across Europe (see also Singer et al., 2004
for similar procedures). To create the illusion of this “European
Consortium,” waiting periods of random lengths (2–8 s) were
interspersed between rounds of each game during which the sys-
tem ostensibly waited for another player on the network to join
the next round. Participants completed 13 rounds of each game
and they were led to believe that these rounds were one-shot,
i.e., that they would not encounter the other player again. This
manipulation was crucial given the scarcity of the LTPs and the
fact that for the two groups of subjects to be comparable to
one another in terms of their decisions. All participants were
fully debriefed of the intention and manipulation of the study
afterwards.
The first round of each game was that of a classic dictator
game (Camerer, 2003). The first player (i.e., the confederate) was
allotted 100MUs and ostensibly given the option to share some
of those MUs with the second player. First plays ranged from
10 to 50MUs with the first player investing 10, 30, and 50MUs
on three occasions each and 20 and 40 on two occasions. In the
2PP the participant was the second player and, as such, received
this offer. In the 3PP and 3PR the participant was a third-party
observer to an interaction between two participants who were
playing on-line.
In the 2PP and 3PP, participants were given the opportu-
nity to punish the first player. They were allotted a total of
50MUs and told that for every 1 MU they spent, three times
that value would be deducted from the first player’s earnings for
that round. Punishment was chosen using a slider on the game
interface.
In the 3PR, participants were again given 50MUs to punish
or recompense each of the players, with each MU spent either
detracting or adding to the other player’s pot. For this game,
the participant was given a slider for each of the other players.
The slider could be moved to the left of center to punish and to
the right of center to recompense. For example, if a participant
moved the first player’s slider 2MUs to the left, 6MUs would be
deducted from the first player’s pot. And if a player moved the
second player’s slider 2MUs to the right, the second player would
receive 6 additional MUs.
Participants completed the 2PP and 3PP first and the order of
these games was counterbalanced. Participants always completed
the 3PR game last. Throughout the reported analyses, we use lin-
ear mixed models to test the effects of group (LTP vs. control),
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FIGURE 1 | Schematics for the three different economic games with
examples of monetary exchanges for each step. In the 2PP, participants
received offers from the dictator (e.g., 10MUs) and then, in the second step
of the game, had the option to pay to punish the dictator (e.g., paying 5 to
deduct 15MUs). In both the 3PP and the 3PR, participants witnessed the
dictator send an offer to the 2nd player and could again pay to punish the
dictator. In the 3PR, participants had the additional option of paying to
recompense the 2nd player (e.g., paying 6 to recompense 18MUs).
game, and dictator offer on behavior while accounting for subject
level random effects.
QUESTIONNAIRES
After the games, participants completed a short series of question-
naires. In one questionnaire, participants rated their emotional
responses to the five first offers made by the dictators dur-
ing the games. On a Likert scale ranging from “Not at all” to
“Very,” participants rated how angry, sad, happy, or disgusted
they felt after receiving the offer. Participants answered these
questions twice: once for their experience as the second player
(in the 2PP) and once for their experience as the third player
(in the 3PP and 3PR). Participants also answered more general
questions about perceptions of fairness. In this questionnaire
(Steinbeis et al., 2012) they were presented with a series of
different distributions of MUs between two people (e.g., one per-
son gets one and the other gets nine, one person gets five and
the other gets five, and etc.). They rated the fairness of each
distribution by marking a line on a continuous Likert scales.
Because of time constraints, five LTPs and one control did not
fill out the self-related anger questionnaires, three LTPs and
one control did not complete the other-related anger question-
naire, and 3 LTPs and one control did not complete the fairness
questionnaire.
RESULTS
DICTATOR GAMEWITH SECOND PARTY PUNISHMENT
We ran a linear mixed model in SPSS 22 to predict punishment
in the 2PP. The dependent variable here was MUs spent to punish
on each given round. As fixed effects we entered the dictator’s
offer for the round (from 10 to 50MUs), the participant group
(i.e., control vs. LTP), and the interaction between these two.
For subject-related random effects we entered the dictator’s offer
and intercept. Because of the distribution of punishment values
(i.e., strongly positively skewed with a mode of zero), we used a
negative binomial probability distribution with a log link in the
model. In line with the hypothesis, this model revealed a signif-
icant effect of group whereby LTPs punished significantly less
than controls, p = 0.01 (see Table 1 for beta values and Figure 2
for illustration). There was also a significant effect of dictator
offer whereby participants punished more for smaller (and thus
more unfair) offers, p < 0.001. The interaction between group
and dictator offer was not significant. The betas for the individual
predictors and their standard errors are reported in Table 11 .
1For this and each of the subsequent models predicting punish-
ment/recompense behavior we re-ran the model, including sex and age
as factors. Neither of these factors were significant in these models nor did
their presence in the models change the pattern or significance level of results.
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Table 1 | Beta values and standard errors the four linear mixed models predicting punishment behavior in the 2PP, 3PP, and 3PR as well as
recompense behavior in the 3PR.
Second party punishment (2PP) Third party punishment (3PP) Punishment and recompense (PR)
Punishment Recompense
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Intercept 3.2*** 0.55 2.85*** 0.51 −14.7*** 2.7 8.1** 2.63
Dictator Offer −0.054*** 0.01 −0.03*** 0.01 0.32*** 0.04 −0.149*** 0.04
LTP (group) −1.88* 0.76 −0.11 0.69 3.5 3.7 6.7◦ 3.6
Dictator Offer × LTP 0.02 0.02 −0.04*** 0.01 −0.1 0.06 −0.09* 0.05
Each model used the size of the dictator’s offer, the participant group (LTP vs. control) and their interaction as predictors. The model for punishment in the 2PP (F =
11.5***, observations = 429), punishment in the 3PP (F = 32.3***, observations = 429), punishment in the 3PR (F = 32.1***, observations = 415), and recompense
in the 3PR (F = 25.4***, observations = 415) were each significant (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, ◦pone-tailed < 0.05).
FIGURE 2 | Plots of the pooled means and their standard errors from the
dictator games with second and third-party punishment (2PP and 3PP).
Punishment is measured as amount spent in MUs to punish the dictator. The
mixed model of punishment behavior revealed that punishment increased
with decreasing size of the dictator’s offer (ps < 0.001). LTPs punished
significantly less than controls in the 2PP (p = 0.01) and equivalently in the
3PP. LTP punishment patterns were more strongly associated with the
dictator offer in the 3PP (p = 0.001).
Supplementary Table 1 further reports proportion of trials in
which punishment occurred as well as the number of participants
who chose to punish for this and the subsequent games.
DICTATOR GAMEWITH THIRD PARTY PUNISHMENT
We ran another linear mixed model with the same structure to
predict punishment in the 3PP (see Table 1 and Figure 2). In
this game, there was no significant difference between group,
p = 0.87. There was again the effect of dictator offer on pun-
ishment, p < 0.001, whereby participants punished more for less
fair offers. There was also an interaction with this variable and
group, p = 0.001 whereby LTPs increased their punishment more
strongly to more unfair offers.
Because different punishment patterns emerged between LTPs
and controls in the 2PP and 3PP, we ran additional analyses to test
for interactions between the games and group (Tables for these
models provided in the Supplementary Materials, Supplementary
Tables 2, 3). In this mixed model, punishment was the depen-
dent variable. Game (2PP vs. 3PP), group, dictator offer, and
the interactions between these variables were entered as fixed
effects. Subject level random effects were again the level of
the dictator offer and the intercept. Indeed, significant interac-
tions emerged between dictator offer and group, β = −0.037,
SE = 0.014, p = 0.006, between game and group, β = −1.72,
SE = 0.50, p = 0.001, as well as game and group and dictator
offer, β = 0.06, SE = 0.015, p < 0.001. To probe the effect of
game further, we analyzed each group separately. In these models,
the fixed effects were game and dictator offer and the interaction
between the two. Subject-level random effects were the dictator
offer (the model was unable to converge with the intercept was
included as a random effect so it was excluded from these mod-
els). When we ran this model to look at LTP behavior, dictator
offer, was significant, β = −0.145, SE = 0.039, p < 0.001. More
importantly, the effect of game was significant whereby LTPs pun-
ished more in the 3PP game than in the 2PP game, β = −1.22,
SE = 0.42, p = 0.003. The interaction between game and dicta-
tor offer was also significant, revealing that LTP punishment was
more strongly related to the decreasing fairness of the dictator
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offer in the 3PP, β = 0.035, SE = 0.013, p = 0.0082. Finally, we
ran this model on the control subjects. Although dictator offer
had its usual effect of increasing punishment with decreasing
fairness of dictator offers, β = −0.048, SE = 0.016, p = 0.003,
there was no effect of game or of the interaction between game
and offer (p = 0.70 and p = 0.11, respectively).
DICTATOR GAMEWITH THIRD PARTY PUNISHMENT AND
RECOMPENSE
To examine participant responses in the 3PR, we ran two more
linear mixed models, one focusing on the response to the dicta-
tor and the other focusing on the response to the second player.
The difference from the previous models was the dependent vari-
able which was, this time, the number of MUs spent on to either
subtract or add to the player’s endowment. To distinguish within
this variable between subtracting (i.e., punishing) and adding
(i.e., recompensing), subtracting was coded as a negative value
and adding was coded as a positive value. Because these variables
were normally distributed than in the previous games, we used a
normal probability distribution and identity link function to the
model. We first ran this model on responses to the dictator and
found a similar pattern to the one that emerged in the 3PP (see
Table 1 and Figure 3). Participants punished more for less fair
dictator offers, p < 0.001. There was neither an effect of group
nor any interaction between group and dictator offer, Fs < 1.
To test the hypothesis that LTPs would be more likely to
recompense victims of unfairness violations, we used the same
2We re-ran this model with years of meditation practice as an additional
factor. This factor did not predict any difference in behavior nor did it sig-
nificantly affect the results of the model, a fact that is likely attributable to the
relatively number of hours practiced across all of the LTPs.
model again, this time to predict responses to the second player
(see Table 1 and Figure 3). There was a main effect of dic-
tator offer whereby participants were more likely recompense
the second player as the dictator’s offers decreased in fairness,
p < 0.001. There was also the main effect of group of group
in the predicted direction whereby LTPs recompensed more,
pone−tailed = 0.03. Furthermore, an interaction emerged between
group and dictator offer in the predicted direction such that
LTPs showed a steeper response to unfairness, increasing rec-
ompense in line with the decreasing fairness of dictator offers,
p = 0.05.
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO UNFAIR OFFERS
To evaluate the degree to which the different dictator offers
elicited emotional responses and to test our hypothesis that LTPs
would respond to unfairness with less anger, we ran a series of
repeated measures ANOVAs on participants’ post-task reports
of feeling angry, sad, disgusted, or happy when either receiving
an offer of a given size in the 2nd party game (2PP) or when
witnessing the second party receive that offer in the 3rd party
games (3PP and 3PR). For each of these models, group (LTP
vs. control) was a between-subjects predictor and dictator offer
(10 through 50 by increments of 10) was a within-subjects pre-
dictor. The rating of the specific emotion was the dependent
variable. We ran this model for each emotion (anger, sadness,
disgust, and happiness) and for each type of second player (i.e.,
when the participant was the 2nd player or the 3rd player). The
ANOVAs for anger produced several significant results. When
participants were the 2nd party recipients of dictator offers, there
was a main effect of anger whereby participants were angrier
the smaller the offer, F(4, 22) = 5.6, p = 0.003. There was also
the significant effect of group in the predicted direction whereby
FIGURE 3 | Plots depicting pooled means and standard errors of
responses in the dictator game with third-party punishment and
recompense (3PR). Punishment is represented as a negative number where
one MU spent to punish is −1 MU. Recompense is represented as a positive
number where one MU spent to recompense is +1 MU. The mixed models
of these data revealed that as dictator offers decreased, participants punished
the dictators and recompensed the second players more (ps < 0.001). LTPs’
punishment behavior did not differ from controls, but they were more likely to
recompense (ponetailed = 0.03). Moreover, LTPs’ recompensatory behavior
was more strongly coupled with Dictator Offers (p = 0.05).
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LTPs were less angry than the controls, F(1, 25) = 10.1, p = 0.004.
Further, a significant interaction between the two predictors
emerged, F(4, 22) = 3.5, p = 0.023, revealing a weaker slope in the
relationship between offer size and anger among LTPs. The pre-
dicted pattern of less anger among LTPs also emerged for anger
responses when participants were the 3rd party witnesses. This
ANOVA again revealed significant effects of offer size, F(4, 24) =
3.7, p = 0.02 and the hypothesized effect of group in the pre-
dicted direction, F(1, 27) = 4.0, ponetailed = 0.03 and interaction
between group and offer size in the predicted direction F(4, 24) =
2.6, ponetailed = 0.03. We repeated these same analyses for sad-
ness, disgust, and happiness in the 3rd and 2nd party games.
No significant effects (or interactions with) group emerged (all
ps> 0.30).
FAIRNESS EVALUATIONS
To compare fairness norms between groups, we ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on participant responses on the fairness ques-
tionnaire, using group as a between-subjects predictor and distri-
bution level as a within-subjects predictor (Figure 4). We found a
significant effect of distribution level, F(5, 23) = 25.2, p < 0.001,
revealing that more unequal the distribution, the less fair partic-
ipants’ ratings. More importantly, however, there was no effect
of group, F(1, 27) < 1.6, suggesting that although groups differed
in the amount of anger expressed this was not due to different
perceptions of fairness.
ANGER, FAIRNESS, AND PUNISHMENT
Next, we analyzed the relationship between self-reported anger
toward dictator offers and actual punishment behavior. To
address this question we ran a mixed model in which the
dependent variable was the punishment behavior in the 2PP
and 3PP games, again with a log link to a negative binomial
distribution. The predictors were group (LTP or control), game
(2PP or 3PP), and the reported anger for the given offer size and
second player (i.e., self vs. other), and the interactions between
these variables. Subject intercept was entered as a random effect.
This model produced a significant effect of anger whereby anger
predicted punishment, β = 0.18, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001. The beta
values for group and for the interactions were not significant
(Supplementary Table 4).We used a similarmodel to predict pun-
ishment in the 3PR, using a linear distribution for punishment
(as above when predicting punishment in the 3PR). The predic-
tors in this model were group (LTP or control), reported anger for
the given offer size, and their interaction. This model replicated
the findings from the 2PP and 3PP with anger predicting greater
punishment, β = −1.76, SE = 0.27, p < 0.001. Again, there were
no significant betas for group or the interaction (Supplementary
Table 5).
Finally, we analyzed the relationship between fairness evalua-
tions and punishment behavior. To do so, we ran a mixed model
in which the dependent variable was punishment in both the
2PP and 3PP, with a log link to a negative binomial distribution.
FIGURE 4 | Estimated marginal means and their standard errors for
anger responses to being the second player (A) or third party witness
(B) to a range of dictator offers as well as fairness ratings of a range of
monetary distributions (C). LTPs were significantly less angry than controls
when they were either the 2nd (p = 0.004) or 3rd party (ponetailed = 0.03).
However, they held equivalent evaluations of fairness.
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The predictors were group, game, and fairness evaluation for
the given offer size, and the interactions between these vari-
ables. Subject intercept was entered as a random effect. This
model revealed a significant effect of fairness in which the less
fair participants evaluated an offer, the more they punished the
dictator, β = −0.10, SE = 0.04, p = 0.005. As one would expect
from the previous analyses, there was an interaction between
group and game, reflecting the fact that LTPs punished less in
the 2PP, β = − 0.937, SE = 0.346, p = 0.007. There was also
an interaction between fairness evaluations and group, whereby
the relationship between fairness evaluations and punishment
was stronger in LTPs, β = −0.181, SE = 0.05, p = 0.001. This
stronger relationship between fairness evaluations and punish-
ment was driven by behavior in the 3PP, as is demonstrated by
a significant interaction between fairness evaluations, game, and
group, β = 0.27, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001 (Supplementary Table 6).
We ran an additional model to see if these effects replicated pun-
ishment in the 3PR, using a linear distribution for punishment.
The predictors in this model were group (LTP or control) and
fairness evaluations for the given offer size and their interaction.
Subject intercept was entered as a random effect. Fairness again
predicted punishment, β = 1.17, SE = 0.13, p < 0.001, although
the interaction did not emerged as significant (Supplementary
Table 7).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we examined behavioral and affective responses to
fairness violations in several economic games among a unique
sample of individuals with long-term training in the cultivation
of prosocial qualities such as altruism, compassion, and prosocial
motivation. Given the nature of such training, we expected these
long-term practitioners to demonstrate less anger in response
to unfairness than gender- and age-matched controls. By conse-
quence we expected them to show comparatively less punishment
than controls when they were the direct victims of fairness vio-
lations, but comparable norm-reinforcement through altruistic
punishment when they were third-party witnesses to injustice.
Finally, we expected more compensatory behaviors when partici-
pants were given the option to restore justice by giving money to
the victims of unfairness.
As predicted, the results revealed differential patterns between
LTPs and controls in response to a series of dictator games with
options to punish and recompense. In line with previous reports
in the literature (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003),
both groups of subjects increased altruistic punishment when dic-
tator offers grew increasingly unfair. As expected, the extent of
punishment among the LTPs was reduced when they themselves
were the victims of unfairness (in the 2PP game), but compara-
ble to controls when they were 3rd parties merely witnessing an
unfair interaction between two other players (in the 3PP and 3PR
games). Although LTPs and controls did not differ in their beliefs
about fairness, unfair behavior elicited less anger from the LTPs.
Given that anger and fairness evaluations both generally predicted
punishment in this study and in the literature (Fehr and Gächter,
2002; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009), this pattern of results sug-
gests that the long-term practitioners punished less when they
were 2nd party recipients of unfair offers because they were less
angry, but were driven by fairness norms to punish equally when
they were 3rd parties witnesses to injustice. In line with such an
interpretation, the altruistic punishment behavior of the LTPs in
the 3PP was more tightly coupled to both the actual level of dic-
tator offers and to their subjective evaluations of the fairness of
those offers.
Nevertheless, this pattern of results raises the question as to
why the LTPs did not punish equivalently in the 2PP even though,
in general, fairness predicts punishment. The current data do not
allow for a satisfying answer, although they parallel recent find-
ings that the punishment of fairness violations, as well as the
compensation of victims of those violations, depends in part on
whether the target of the fairness violation is the self vs. another
person (FeldmanHall et al., 2014). Further work will need to
more deeply probe the motivational distinction between acting
on behalf of oneself vs. on behalf of another to better understand
the mechanisms underlying these differences. Along similar lines,
other motives underlying punishment behavior have been sug-
gested in the literature, such as spite (Jensen, 2010; Espin et al.,
2012; Brañas-Garza et al., 2014). While it may be possible that
the present data could also in part be explained by the operation
of other mechanisms (i.e., the presence of spite or responses to
inequality), our evidence speaks most clearly for a motivation of
anger as a result of unfairness to underlie the punishment behav-
ior of both LTPs and controls, a finding in line with previous
studies (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Future studies should focus on
exploring the plasticity of other social motivations in the context
of altruistic punishment.
This focus on equity among the LTPs emerged again in the 3PR
when participants were given the opportunity to recompense vic-
tims in addition to punishing perpetrators of fairness violations.
Whereas, it has previously been shown that a short-term inter-
vention of compassion meditation in naïve subjects increased the
tendency to redistribute funds between an unfair dictator and
his victim (Weng et al., 2013), it remained an open question
whether this was the result of a desire to punish the dictator or
to recompense the victim. Here we disentangled these motives
by providing participants with both the opportunities to pun-
ish and recompense the players. Although LTPs again punished
in a similar fashion to controls, they showed a distinct pattern
of recompensation, increasing their donation to the victim as the
dictator’s offers became progressively less fair. These data suggest
that the cultivation of altruism and compassion may selectively
increase the motivation to perform a kind act toward a victim of
a transgression and not the merely desire to punish per se.
Previous studies have shown that anger in response to fair-
ness violations and subsequent punishment behavior are linked
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Grecucci
et al., 2013). Together, our results indicate that training feel-
ings of compassion may alter behavioral responses to fairness
violations through reducing these concomitant negative emo-
tions experienced when responding directly to unfairness, while
still supporting the motivation to minimize inequity (see also
Singer and Steinbeis, 2009). Accordingly, two studies by Klimecki
et al. (2013a,b) showed that training in compassion selectively
increased activity of brain regions known to be involved in
positive affect, such as the ventral striatum and the medial
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orbitofrontal cortex, when confronted with the suffering of
another. We speculate that increased prosocial motivation and
affect in response to the suffering of others can serve as a buffer
in social situations which, in the present case, reduced anger
in response to unfair offers and led to increased motivation to
restore equity by means of compensating the victim.
These findings have important implications for the evaluation
and enforcement of justice. The fact that LTPs punished in the
relative absence of anger suggests that training in compassion can
lead from sanctioning as a function of vengeful and retributive
motives (i.e., punishment to punish the transgressor) to sanc-
tioning in order to restore justice and equity (i.e., to solve the
problem). This potential shift from a more deontological to a
more consequentialist approach to punishment would represent
a shift from common lay responses to injustice that are reac-
tionary and potentially counterproductive to a sharper focus on
the actual outcomes of punishment behavior itself (Nozick, 1981;
Darley and Pittman, 2003; Greene, 2008; Aharoni and Fridlund,
2012). Indeed, it has previously been shown that whereas punish-
ment in social interactions is effective to sustain cooperation, it
also incurs hidden costs to all parties involved, particularly over
repeated interactions (e.g., Fehr and List, 2004; Rand et al., 2009).
The fact that LTPs were uniquely concerned with compensating
victims further argues that their focus was, more broadly, on an
equitable outcome and not merely on vengeance for bad behavior.
Furthermore, given evidence that the experience of sustained neg-
ative affect constitutes a reliable predictor for developing health
risks (Pressman et al., 2013), showing that justice can still be done
without negative emotions such as anger highlights potential
health benefits of compassion training as a buffer to antagonistic
social situations (see also Singer and Steinbeis, 2009).
Our findings of differences between the LTPs and controls in
terms of experienced emotions and concomitant punishment and
compensatory behaviors in response to fairness violations need to
be carefully interpreted with regards to a potential self-selection
bias of the sample. Indeed, the present study is not in a position
to tease apart whether such differences arise as a function of the
training or shared dispositions between choosing such trainings
and our observed behaviors. However, since previous studies have
been able to show that even short-term interventions of com-
passion training can elicit similar behaviors as observed in the
present study (Weng et al., 2013), the present study can be seen
as a real-life example of compassion training, which in combina-
tion is in a position to triangulate on the same point, namely the
plasticity of social preferences.
Our findings must further be discussed within a more general
framework of the plasticity of prosocial motivation, behavior, and
social preferences. While most training studies in empathy and
compassion research have so far focused on how mental train-
ing in social emotions and motivation might impact changes in
brain responses associated with affiliation and reward (Klimecki
et al., 2013a,b) or compassion-based helping behavior (Leiberg
et al., 2011), sanctioning behaviors have not been studied (but
see Weng et al., 2013). In the current research, we show that the
long-term training of qualities such as altruism, compassion, and
loving kindness correlate with unique patterns in norm reinforc-
ing altruistic punishment and the recompensation of victims of
unfairness. These potentially training-related changes in social
preferences contradict current economic models of human social
behavior, which posit a trait-like stability to preferences and sug-
gest that they are imperviousness to influence (Becker, 1976;
Stigler and Becker, 1977). Moreover, they illustrate that individu-
als might learn to punish injustice and help victims in the relative
absence of anger, findings that have considerable ramifications for
the plasticity of individual preferences and the benefits of mental
training for the society as a whole.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fnbeh.
2014.00424/abstract
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